You are currently browsing the tag archive for the ‘Rand Paul’ tag.
Josh Marshall rightly extrapolates from the utterly insane and terrifying comments of Ted Yoho (R-Airstrip One) that we should all be very, very afraid. He’s not wrong, exactly (I just said he was “rightly,” after all) but I don’t think we’re going to default on the national debt. Here’s why:
40-50%: Debt limit compromise on process. Not enough, methinks, has been made of this report from Greg Sargent:
The principle articulated internally is simple. Never mind delaying or defunding Obamacare — there will be no policy concessions in exchange for a debt limit that would damage Dem priorities. Republicans must refocus on legitimate legislative means, i.e., the legislative process’ normal give and take. In exchange for the debt limit hike, there will be no medical device tax repeal. No Keystone pipeline. Obama administration officials are open to the possibility of face saving moves by Republicans being part of the endgame, but only ones involving process — not policy concessions — such as the McConnell provision, a device floated last year that would have largely transferred debt limit authority to the president.
This strikes me as being both politically and policy-wise the best solution. The Democrats and the President maintain that they did not offer policy concessions for ransom, the Republicans get to claim that they won something, and the potential of future debt ceiling crises is permanently defused in a wholly-legitimized manner. The main goal the President is trying to accomplish (and that the whole world should be behind) is that a faction of Congress cannot threaten massive catastrophe in exchange for unilateral policy concessions, and even a completely clean debt ceiling hike doesn’t wholly remove that possibility from the table in the future, though it would make it far less likely.
20-30%: Clean debt ceiling hike, AKA, the GOP caves. Who knows what lives in the addled mind of John Boehner? Of which GOPers are truly mad and which are eyeing the emergency exits on the crazy train? Certainly, though, it seems that if the Senate were to pass a clean hike soon, the pressure on the House to do the same on Oct 16-17 would be enormous, and it seems that wouldn’t be a too-unlikely scenario. This is certainly what the President wants, and it would hopefully defuse future crises of this nature, but of course, nothing is guaranteed.
20-30%: The financial crisis is substituted with a wholly political one. In this scenario, the President would emerge when the first payment is due beyond what is in Treasury’s coffers and above the legal borrowing limit and, legal memo in hand, declare the debt ceiling unconstitutional and order his administration to proceed as if it did not exist. (I don’t think the platinum coin, awesome though it is, has a snowball’s chance in hell of happening). What would happen then is – the government and debt markets proceed as normal, forever. The GOP would epically flip out, the House would pass a bill/resolution ordering the POTUS to respect the debt ceiling, but a) it wouldn’t pass the Senate and b) the POTUS/WH would simply lump that in with “unconstitutional threats to the credit of the US” and move along. The House would then impeach the President on a purely party-line basis, the Senate would acquit, and there it would lie. Certainly nothing would move forward in Congress through the rest of Obama’s second term, but it’s not like anything would anyway! Whether the POTUS’s decision was correct legally would be debated, but morally, pragmatically, and governance-ally the consensus would be sympathetic to him. This would have the effect of burying the debt ceiling as an issue forever, since it’s unlikely that the GOP would believe so strongly in this that, in 2017, a President Christie/Jindal/Cruz/Paul/Palin/whomever would take the oath of office and immediately order a cessation of payments on the national debt. It would also have the odd effect of making any US default ever, for any reason, untenable legally, and thus prevent the US from any kind of Argentina/Greece kind of debt restructuring/selective defaulting down the line, meaning an actual US debt crisis (as opposed to the political crisis nominally centered around the issue of the national debt) would have to be resolved through a combination of austerity and inflation.
…and that’s it. I truly do not believe that Obama and his administration has any incentive to elect to actually catastrophically default over taking the legal out above, and I think they would elect for that knowing full well it would result in impeachment.
But of course, they can’t say they’re going to do that, or even hint that they would, because that would eliminate all incentive for the GOP to cooperate in advancing either of the two other scenarios above. The GOP would love to paint Obama as a lawless debt-addicted tyrant and has been all-but-openly itching for a reason to impeach him since Jan 20 2009, so Obama in fact has to act like Option C is off the table even if he’s completely convinced that it’s the only alternative.
It’s going to be an interesting couple of weeks, folks.
Freddie deBoer’s post on Rand Paul’s filibuster has inspired three thoughts – one about why he’s mostly right, one about where he goes wrong, and one about how this all implicates our national institutional design.
Firstly, Freddie is generally speaking on-the-nose – there is nothing about Rand Paul’s positions on other issues or political ambitions that should prevent anyone who cares about restraining executive power and preserving civil rights and rule of law from cheerfully supporting his endeavors. Anything that brings more attention to these issues is good, anything that puts more pressure on the executive branch is good. This filibuster is a distinct act (though not wholly separable) from his other political stances, and thus can and should be supported in good faith and conscience.
However, I think Freddie has somewhat blinkered himself in not broadening his view. Forget about Rand Paul’s mostly-despicable views on almost every other class of public policy issues; on this particular issue, Paul is definitively in the minority amongst his own party. That, though, is what made this filibuster so politically clever for him. The Republican Party is split between those who are (mostly) consistent in favoring reduced government power and those who simply support low taxes on rich people and bombing undesireables, and the weight is largely towards the latter. However, the GOP is very much unified on the subject of hating Barack Obama. So by spontaneously creating a dynamic by which a question that leaves Paul in an intra-party minority into a referendum on spiting the President, he managed to frame himself as a leader on the issue and bring along most of his party with him since they were motivated by not wanting to look weak on the key GOP issue of sandbagging Obama. Especially when you look at the list of key GOP contenders for 2016 – in addition to Paul, you have Rubio, Christie, Jindal, Bush, Ryan, Hunstman, Santorum, McDonnell, Walker, Daniels, Portman, Cruz…any big ones I might be forgetting? – almost every other candidate is either explicitly or implicitly on the other side of this issue. What Paul did yesterday gained him a lot of exposure while simultaneously turning a weakness that isolated him into an instance of combative, Capra-esque leadership.
This is not to say that Paul’s motivations (or his internal ranking of those motivations) are the key factors for us as citizens – to the extend Rand Paul made supporting unchecked state power to do violence more costly, it was unambiguously a Good Thing. But the dynamics also expose a serious flaw in our Constitutional institutions. Namely, it really does seem as though many of the Framers bought their own hype and believed the major points of conflict in the state they designed would be a) inter-state and b) intra-federal-governmental. But political partisanship, as in retrospect seems inevtable, ended up playing a major role in political organization in the United States and totally threw a wrench into those dynamics, especially b). The expectation that "Congress," as a body, would check "the Executive" is perhaps-fatally compromised during high periods of partisan polarization, when the Executive is unified but Congress is deeply divided, and members of Congress may prioritize supporting their party over their institutional prerogatives. So you could have a dynamic whereby, say, one party is more inclined than the other to oppose state violence, but when that party has control of the executive branch they suddenly find state violence is really useful and their co-partisans in Congress prioritize winning partisan battles. This, of course, means that these kinds of issues can quickly become corrosive to the body politic and result in the kind of self-perpetuating cynicism that further empowers state violence. I’m not sure what to do about that, per se, but I am certain that this is the correct way to understand yesterday’s events and why I am cheered but still quite wary by the Paul filibuster.